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TINKERING WITH THE PARAMETERS OF STUDENT FREE
SPEECH RIGHTS FOR ONLINE EXPRESSION: WHEN SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES KNOCK ON THE SCHOOLHOUSE
GATE
*

Allison Martin

I. INTRODUCTION
1
“Hey! Teacher! Leave those kids alone!”
Suppose Tommy, a ninth-grade student, and a group of his
friends are playing video games in Tommy’s living room after school.
Tommy is upset about being scolded in science class today, and he
begins making offensive comments about his teacher, Mr. Doe. He
mockingly refers to Mr. Doe as “Mr. Hoe,” and makes vulgar jokes
about “Mr. Hoe” fornicating with animals. Although Tommy’s
speech is offensive and not the type of language society would
condone, it would offend our constitutional expectations to suggest
that the school has the authority to regulate Tommy’s expression
2
while he is sitting in his living room outside of school hours.
Although this scenario is straightforward, if Tommy made the same
disparaging comments on a website, the permissibility of school
intervention becomes a more convoluted inquiry because the
traditional free-speech legal paradigm does not neatly fit in the
online context.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the scope of students’
free-speech rights in the Internet context, but several circuit courts of
3
appeals have grappled with the issue. The Court has received several
*
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1
PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall (Part II), on THE WALL (Columbia 1980).
2
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1097 (U.S. 2012). (“[W]e do not think the First Amendment can tolerate
the School District stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home . . . .”).
3
See, e.g., J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct 1097 (2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct 1095 (2012).
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petitions for certiorari in online speech cases, but thus far the Justices
4
have denied certiorari. Because of the lack of guidance, lower courts
have experienced difficulty applying the traditional student-speech
jurisprudence to the online context where the expression occurs
5
outside of school.
Currently, four Supreme Court decisions govern the application
of the First Amendment to the educational environment: Tinker v. Des
6
Moines Independent Community School District, Bethel School District v.
7
8
9
Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick.
Notably, all four cases were factually rooted in speech that occurred
10
during school hours and/or on school property. Online speech,
which occurs in the “borderless medium” of the Internet, does not fit
neatly into the on-campus/off-campus speech dichotomy of First
11
Amendment precedent. Because the inherent characteristics of the
Internet render a determination of the precise location of online
expression nearly impossible, this Comment argues that cyberspace is
best viewed as a unique jurisdictional “location” for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, and therefore online speech should not be
subject to the traditional “on school grounds” legal framework. If the
Supreme Court elects to hear one of the online student-speech cases
in the future, the Court will have the opportunity to introduce some
much-needed clarity to this area of jurisprudence by holding that
schools may only regulate speech related to educators in cases where
the speech causes a substantial disruption of school affairs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
addressed the scope of students’ First Amendment protection in the
Internet age in Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. v. Blue
12
Mountain School District. Factually, Layshock and Blue Mountain are

4

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 3.
Carolyn Joyce Mattus, Legal Update: Is it Really My Space? Public Schools and
Student Speech on the Internet After Layshock v. Hermitage and Snyder v. Blue Mountain
School District, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 318, 332 (2010).
6
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7
478 U.S. 675 (1986).
8
484 U.S. 260 (1988).
9
551 U.S. 393 (2007).
10
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551
U.S. 393.
11
James M. Patrick, Comment, The Civility-Police: The Rising Need to Balance
Students’ Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against the School’s Compelling Interests, 79
U. CIN. L. REV. 855, 886 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011); J.S. v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011).
5
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13

substantially similar.
In both cases, a student created a false
MySpace profile for a school principal, wrote unflattering and
offensive descriptions of the principal on the profile, and was
14
subsequently suspended for the conduct.
Despite the factual
similarities, two Third Circuit panels, comprised of different judges,
reached divergent legal conclusions, creating some intra-circuit
15
friction. The Third Circuit subsequently vacated both judgments
16
and reheard the cases en banc. The en banc decisions, issued on
the same day, held that the two schools violated the students’ First
Amendment rights by imposing punishment for the online
expression because the school districts could not show that the
speech created a foreseeable risk of a substantial disruption in the
17
school.
Layshock and Blue Mountain provide interesting examples of the
complex constitutional issues that can arise out of a childish prank
expressing frustrations towards a teacher. In the online context,
lower courts have struggled to harmonize the idea that students do
18
not lose their First Amendment freedoms at the schoolhouse gate
with the Supreme Court’s recognition that students’ constitutional
19
rights are not always analogous to the rights of adults. The scope of
school officials’ authority to regulate students’ Internet-based speech
20
is an issue that is ripe for Supreme Court resolution. Given the
21
prevalence of Internet usage by today’s schoolchildren, guidance
from the Supreme Court on the parameters of student speech is
13

See Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915.
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 20711; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 920.
15
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, No. 074465, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11994 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011); J.S. v. Blue Mountain
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, No. 08-4138, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
11947 (3d. Cir. June 13, 2011); see Joseph Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse
Gate: Offensive, Online Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L.
REV. 97, 100 (2010); Katie Maloney, Conflicting Online Speech Rulings Vacated, Will be
Heard by Full Third Circuit, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2010),
https://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=2066.
16
Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915.
17
Layshock, 650 F.3d 205; Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915.
18
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
19
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
20
Tomain, supra note 15, at 102.
21
A 2010 report concluded that ninety-three percent of the school-aged
population between the ages of twelve and seventeen use the Internet. Furthermore,
seventy-three percent of “wired” teens use social networking websites. AMANDA
LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA AND YOUNG ADULTS (2010),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young
-Adults/Summary-of-Findings.aspx.
14
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desperately needed. Free speech in schools “impact[s] millions of
22
students and thousands of school administrators.” Both students
and administrators would benefit from the establishment of a
23
standard governing online speech. Presently, school officials are left
guessing at when they do and do not have the authority to punish
24
student speech, and defending subsequent litigation is a waste of
school resources and taxpayer dollars.
From the students’
perspective, the lack of clarity can result in a chilling effect where
students are nervous to voice opinions on important issues due to
25
fear of being censured for “inappropriate” language.
Part II of this Comment details the Supreme Court
jurisprudence governing the First Amendment’s application to
student speech. Part III of this Comment provides an overview of the
Third Circuit cases illustrating the issues that arise when schools are
confronted with a student’s off-campus Internet speech. Part IV
emphasizes the need for Supreme Court clarification of the
applicable standard that courts should apply when confronted with
offensive online student speech. Part IV continues with the argument
that (1) cyberspace should be analyzed as a unique and independent
location for First Amendment analysis, and (2) the Tinker standard
requiring a showing of a substantial disruption within the school
should be the governing inquiry in all student online speech cases
where the subject of the speech is a school employee. Further, Part
IV argues that the First Amendment should not preclude schools
from imposing punishment in situations where the online speech is
targeting a fellow student or where the speech poses a threat of
violence within the school. Part V concludes, reiterating the
ambiguity in the current law and proposing a solution to the
troublesome problem.

22

David Hudson, High Court Asked to Hear Student Online Speech Case, FIRST
AMENDMENT CTR. (July 29, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/high-court
-asked-to-hear-student-online-speech-case (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
23
See Maloney, supra note 15.
24
See Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still
Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2009) (arguing that when principals are faced
with a decision between respecting a student’s free speech rights and addressing a
possible threat, it is a “no brainer” from the principal’s perspective to restrict the
speech).
25
Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach,
63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 407 (2011); Wendy Davis, No More Pencils, No More Facebook, THE
NATIONAL PULSE (July 1, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine
/article/no_more_pencils_no_more_facebooks.
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II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE WITHIN THE “SCHOOLHOUSE
GATES”
Four Supreme Court decisions establish the legal underpinnings
of students’ free-speech rights, all of which specifically address speech
26
that occurred on the school property and/or during school hours.
The first case, Tinker v. Des Moines, is the seminal case governing First
27
Amendment analysis in the public school context.
Tinker is
generally recognized as the “high water mark” for students’ freedom
28
of expression; it is the most protective of students’ rights as it
requires a showing that the speech posed a foreseeable risk of a
29
substantial disruption within the school. After that decision, the
Supreme Court carved out three exceptions to the free-speech
30
paradigm. These exceptions, while limiting Tinker’s bite, did not
overturn Tinker, which remains the starting point for all speech
31
analysis inside the schoolhouse gate. In the online context, lower
courts have relied on these four cases as the crux of their First
Amendment analysis, even though the original holdings were limited
32
to traditional speech that was definitively on-campus.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines
In Tinker, three students were suspended from school after they
refused to remove the black armbands they wore as an expression of
33
opposition to the military conflict in Vietnam. The legal analysis
began with the since oft-quoted maxim that, despite the unique
characteristics of the education environment, neither students nor
teachers “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
34
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” The Court emphasized the
limitations on the authority of school officials to censor student
opinions, especially in cases where the prohibition is based on a
35
desire to suppress a particular viewpoint.
Tinker established the
26

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Bethel
Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
27
See 393 U.S. 503; Tomain, supra note 15, at 109.
28
Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Youth and Social Media: Student Speech Online: Too
Young to Exercise the Right of Free Speech?, 7 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 101, 110 (2011).
29
Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
30
See Fraser, 478 U.S. 675; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Morse, 551 U.S. 393.
31
See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
32
Id.
33
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
34
Id. at 506.
35
Id. at 511. The court emphasized that the prohibition was clearly content-
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standard that the First Amendment protects student speech unless
school authorities reasonably believe the speech will cause a
“substantial disruption of or material interference with school
36
activities.”
Therefore, unless the student “materially disrupts
classwork, or . . . [creates] substantial disorder or invasion of the
37
rights of others,” the school cannot impose restrictions on students’
38
freedom of expression.
Although Tinker involved a political
message, the majority did not base its decision on the fact the
39
expression was “high-value” speech.
In defining what constitutes a substantial disruption, the Court
opined that “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompan[ies] an unpopular viewpoint” is an insufficient
40
justification for infringing upon a student’s First Amendment rights.
The politically charged context in which Tinker was decided is
extremely important for lower courts to keep in mind when applying
the standard, given the divisive nature of the Vietnam War and the
41
realistic potential for violent conflict over the war.
Tinker’s facts offer some guidance in discerning the parameters
of the substantial disruption standard. The record in Tinker notes
that the armbands caused some discussion outside of the
42
classrooms, that a dispute over the armbands interrupted a math
lesson, and that some students made disparaging comments towards
43
one of the armband-wearers. The majority concluded that these
44
incidents did not reach the level of a substantial disruption, and
thus set the standard for circumstances under which the school may
45
punish student speech within the bounds of the Constitution.
B. Bethel School District v. Fraser
The Supreme Court next addressed the parameters of free
speech within public schools in Bethel, upholding the school district’s
based, and thus was subject to a higher standard of scrutiny. Id.
36
Id. at 514.
37
Id. at 51314.
38
Id. at 513.
39
See generally id.
40
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
41
TOM WELLS, THE WAR WITHIN: AMERICA’S BATTLE OVER VIETNAM 297 (2005)
(“America’s high schools were the scenes of twenty-seven bombings and attempted
bombings.”).
42
393 U.S. at 514.
43
Id. at 51819 (Black, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 514.
45
See, e.g., Bethel Sch. District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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authority to suspend a high-school student after the student gave a
46
sexually explicit speech during a school assembly. The student used
extended and elaborate sexual metaphors to reference a friend who
47
was running for student government. During the speech, students
48
hooted and acted out the sexual gestures referenced in the speech.
In upholding the school’s authority to suspend the student, the Court
held that the First Amendment is not a barrier when school officials
determine that allowing the vulgar and lewd speech during a school
event would undermine the school’s educational mission, and
therefore the school seeks to disassociate itself from the vulgar
49
content of the speech.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan emphasized the
50
narrow application of Fraser. The Justice opined that the holding
was limited “to restrict a high school student’s use of disruptive
language in a speech given to a high school assembly”; the opinion
51
did not give school officials limitless authority to regulate speech.
Legal scholars have read Fraser to require (1) some element of a
captive audience, (2) speech with lewd or offensive sexual content,
and (3) the school’s needs to disassociate itself from the content of
52
the speech. Because Fraser involved offensive and vulgar student
speech, the applicability of the Fraser holding to student speech over
the Internet has attracted attention from lower courts and legal
53
scholars.
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
In Kuhlmeier, the Court addressed the issue of the extent of
editorial control that a school can permissibly exercise over the
54
contents of a student-produced newspaper. The students alleged
that the school infringed upon their First Amendment rights when a
teacher removed two articles from the final edition of the
46

478 U.S. 675. It is also important to note that students were required to either
attend the assembly or report to study hall. Id. at 677.
47
Id. at 677–78. “I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in
his shirt, his character is firm—but most of all, his belief in you, the students of
Bethel, is firm. . . . Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. . . .”.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
48
Id. at 677.
49
Id. at 685.
50
Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51
Id.
52
Tomain, supra note 15, at 104.
53
See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
54
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
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newspaperone describing pregnancy at the school and the other
55
The Court concluded that,
discussing the impact of divorce.
because the paper was intended to be a “supervised learning
experience for journalism students,” the school was within its
authority to reasonably regulate content as long as the editorial
56
control was related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.
In
reaching this holding, the Court explicitly noted that the Tinker
standard did not apply to circumstances where the school essentially
endorses the speech through publication in the school paper and the
57
school seeks to disassociate itself from the content. Given the facts
of Kuhlmeier, this case is of little applicable value in situations
involving offensive online student speech where the speech is clearly
not sanctioned by the school.
D. Morse v. Frederick
58

Morse is the most recently defined exception to Tinker. In
Morse, a group of students unfurled a banner that read “BONG HiTS
4 JESUS” during a school-sponsored field trip that occurred during
59
school hours. After one student refused to take down the banner,
he was suspended for violating school policy by encouraging the use
60
of drugs.
In a 54 decision, the Court held that a school may
“restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is
61
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.” Justice Alito and
Justice Kennedy contributed the final two votes necessary to reach a
62
plurality decision, and therefore “the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
63
judgments on the narrowest grounds.” In joining with the judgment
in Morse, Justice Alito repeatedly emphasized that the holding is
narrowly limited to the regulation of drug-related speech, which
64
“stand[s] at the far reaches of what the First Amendment permits.”

55

Id.
Id. at 27073.
57
Id.
58
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
59
Id. at 39798.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 403.
62
Id.
63
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
64
Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring).
56
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III. THE APPLICATION OF TINKER AND ITS PROGENY TO THE ONLINE
SPEECH CONTEXT
Layshock v. Hermitage School District and J.S. v. Blue Mountain School
District illustrate the difficulties that lower courts have experienced
when discerning the permissible scope of school regulation of offcampus, online speech under traditional First Amendment legal
precedents. The Second Circuit, in Doninger v. Niehoff, reached a
conflicting conclusion and, perhaps more importantly, demonstrated
the need for clarification of what constitutes a substantial disruption
65
under the Tinker standard.
A. Layshock v. Hermitage School District
Justin Layshock was a seventeen-year-old high school senior
when he used his grandmother’s computer after school to create a
66
67
fictitious MySpace profile of his principal, Eric Trosch. Justin filled
out the personal information section of the profile by falsely
answering a series of survey questions, with all of the responses
reflecting a theme of “big,” which Justin intended to be a reference to
68
Mr. Trosch’s size.
1. Birthday: too drunk to remember
2. Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
3. In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
4. In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
5. In the past month have you gone skinny dipping: big
69
lake, not big dick . . . .
Under the “[i]nterests” section of the profile, Justin wrote
“Transgender Appreciators of Alcoholic Beverages” and listed
“Steroids International” as a group in which Mr. Trosch was a
70
member. Justin proceeded to add other students as “friends” of the
fake profile, and as a result, knowledge of the profile’s existence
71
quickly spread throughout the school. Justin accessed the profile
from school on two occasionsonce to show friends in Spanish class,
65

See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
66
MySpace is a popular social networking website, which allows users to share
personal information with other users and add other users as “friends.” Doe v.
MySpace Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413 (5th
Cir. 2008).
67
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 20708 (3d Cir. 2011).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
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and once purportedly to delete it before a teacher stopped him.
Mr. Trosch learned about the profile through his daughter, a
73
junior at the school. School officials met with Justin and his mother,
74
After the meeting,
and Justin admitted to creating the profile.
Justin took it upon himself to apologize to Mr. Trosch, both in
75
person and with a written letter of apology. The School District
nevertheless sent Justin a letter informing him that the punishment
76
for his conduct was to be determined at an informal hearing. At the
hearing, the School District imposed the following punishment: (1) a
ten-day suspension; (2) placement in an alternative education setting
within the school for the remainder of the year; (3) a ban from all
extracurricular activities; and (4) a ban from participation in his
77
graduation ceremony.
78
The Layshock family brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
the district court, both parties moved for summary judgment, and the
court entered judgment in favor of Justin on the grounds that the
79
punishment violated his First Amendment rights. A Third Circuit
panel affirmed this decision on the grounds that permitting the
school to punish Justin for his out-of-school conduct could create a
80
dangerous precedent. The Third Circuit subsequently ordered a
81
rehearing en banc.
In the en banc opinion, the court commenced its legal analysis
with a brief overview of the Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse
82
standards. Applying the facts of the case to the First Amendment
analytical framework, the court concluded that “[w]e do not think
the First Amendment can tolerate the School District stretching its
authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin while
he is sitting at her computer after school in order to punish him for
83
expressive conduct he engaged in there.” The court placed heavy
72

Id. at 209.
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208.
74
Id. at 209. Justin’s parents also disciplined him for his conduct. Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 210.
78
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). Section 1983 creates a cause of action
against state actors for the deprivation of an individual’s constitutional and
statutorily-granted civil rights. Id.
79
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 211.
80
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated for
reh’g en banc, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
81
Id.
82
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 21114.
83
Id. at 216.
73
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emphasis on the school district’s failure to establish that Justin’s
speech caused a substantial disturbance or a foreseeable expectation
of a disturbance, and therefore held that Justin’s speech could not be
84
punished under Tinker.
The court opined that it would be bad
policy to establish that a school has limitless authority to control
student conduct at home to the same extent the school can control
85
the student’s conduct within school.
The school district argued that the speech was punishable under
Fraser because the language in the MySpace profile was vulgar, lewd,
86
and offensive, and was aimed at the school community. The court
rejected this argument because Fraser does not apply to “conduct
which occurred outside of the school context” and Justin’s expression
87
fell outside of the schoolhouse gate.
In determining the scope of student free-speech rights, the
Layshock court correctly applied Tinker as the governing standard, and
appropriately declined to stretch Fraser to apply to all offensive
student speech.
B. J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District
J.S., an eighth-grade honor-roll student, created a MySpace
profile of the Blue Mountain Middle School principal, James
88
McGonigle, with a friend in J.S.’s home after school. The profile
featured Mr. McGonigle’s official school photograph, but falsely
identified the user as a “bisexual Alabama middle school principal
89
named ‘M-Hoe.’”
J.S. depicted Mr. McGonigle’s interests as
“detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain, spending time with
my child (who looks like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking
90
in my office, [and] hitting on students and their parents.” In the
“About me” section of the profile, J.S. posted the following
unflattering description of McGonigle:
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. It’s your oh so wonderful,
fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I
have come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other
principal’s [sic] to be just like me. I know, I know, you’re
all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to myspace is
84

Id.
Id.
86
Id. at 21617.
87
Id. at 219.
88
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011).
89
Id.
90
Id. “Fraintrain” was a reference to McGonigle’s wife, who was also a school
employee. Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
85
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because—I am keeping an eye on my students (who[m] I
care for so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend,
and aren’t in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind),
dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and
last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who
91
satisfies my needs) MY FRAINTRAIN.
Initially, J.S. made the profile publically accessible to anyone, but
later changed the settings to private so only individuals added as a
92
“friend” could view the content. Because the school’s computers
blocked MySpace, students could not access the profile from the
93
school. But the profile did make its way on to school grounds when
94
McGonigle requested that a student bring him a printout of the site.
McGonigle held a conference with J.S., her friend, and both sets of
parents, and the parties were informed that the students would
95
receive a ten-day suspension.
J.S.’s family sued the Blue Mountain School District under 42
96
U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted Blue Mountain’s motion
97
for summary judgment. The district court held that even though
the Tinker standard did not govern because the school failed to prove
that a substantial disruption occurred or was likely to occur, the
school had authority to punish J.S. under Morse and Fraser because
the speech in question was “vulgar, lewd and potentially illegal
98
speech [and] had an effect on campus.” J.S. appealed, and a Third
Circuit panel affirmed and held that, under Tinker, “off-campus
speech that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a substantial
disruption or material interference with a school need not satisfy any
geographical technicality in order to be regulated pursuant to
99
Tinker.” Finding that there was a threat of a substantial disruption to
the school, the Third Circuit panel concluded that the School
100
District’s suspension did not infringe J.S.’s First Amendment rights.
This decision was subsequently vacated for rehearing by the Third

91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 921.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 921.
Id. at 922. The School District Superintendent later approved this suspension.

Id.
96

Id. at 920.
Id. at 923.
98
Id. at 923 (internal citations omitted).
99
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist, 593 F.3d 286, 301 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated for
reh’g, No. 08-4138, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11947 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011).
100
Id. at 303.
97
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101

Circuit en banc.
In its en banc opinion affirming the panel’s judgment, the Third
Circuit began the legal analysis by “assum[ing], without deciding,
102
that Tinker applies to J.S.’s speech in this case.” The court clarified
the Tinker requirement that the speech must pose a foreseeable risk
of a substantial disruption, but it does not need to be absolutely
103
certain that disruption will occur. The Blue Mountain School District
court concluded that the general rumblings about the profile, slight
class disturbance, and rearranging of a counselor’s schedule did not
amount to a substantial disruption under Tinker, and there was no
104
valid reason for school officials to foresee a substantial disruption.
The court rejected the school district’s argument that the speech
was punishable under Fraser, holding that the Fraser “lewdness”
standard only applies to on-campus speech and does not reach
105
online, out-of-school expression
The Third Circuit placed heavy
emphasis on the fact that the content of the profile was so ridiculous
that there was no way a reasonable person could have taken it as
106
fact.
The Blue Mountain School District dissent argued that, under
Tinker, a substantial disruption did occur within the school, and
furthermore, the decision “severely undermines” a school’s ability to
107
impose discipline on students that disrupt the school environment.
The dissent focused on the “malicious . . . vulgar and obscene”
content of the profile as sufficient to render a showing of potential for
108
a substantial disruption within the school.
Similar to the holding in Layshock, the Blue Mountain School
District court reached the proper result in denying the school district
the authority to punish J.S. for her off-campus online speech.
C. Doninger v. Niehoff
The Second Circuit addressed a similar issue, but diverged from
the Third Circuit in its approach to addressing the parameters of

101

J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d
Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
102
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 926.
103
Id. at 928
104
Id. at 925, 929.
105
Id. at 933.
106
Id. at 930
107
Id. at 941, 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
108
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
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students’ First Amendment rights. In Doninger v. Niehoff, a student,
Avery Doninger, was prohibited from accepting a studentgovernment position after she sent a mass e-mail and posted
comments on her blog expressing her feelings about the school
110
administration’s cancellation of an annual school music festival. In
her post, the student wrote that “jamfest [was] cancelled due to [the]
douchebags in [the] central office,” and urged other students to email school administrators about the cancelled event to “piss [the
111
principal] off more.”
Doninger’s efforts resulted in an influx of
112
calls and e-mails to the school. The school discovered the blog post
two weeks after the resolution of the situation, and at that point the
principal informed Doninger that she was no longer eligible to run
113
for student government because of her inflammatory comments.
Despite not appearing on the ballot, Doninger won the election as a
write-in candidate, but the school would not permit her to accept the
114
position.
The Second Circuit found that the deluge of e-mails, phone
calls, angry students, and several disrupted schedules amounted to a
substantial disturbance under Tinker; therefore, the school was within
115
its authority to punish Doninger for her conduct. In reaching this
conclusion, the court explained that it was important in this case that
the punishment imposed—restricting Doninger’s participation in
student government—was reasonable given that the “disruption” was
116
related to a governmental function.
Although the Second Circuit properly concluded that Tinker was
the controlling standard in Doninger, the court’s conclusion that the
e-mails, phone calls, and upset students were sufficient to amount to
117
a potential disruption illustrates the need for clarification of what
constitutes a substantial disruption, with particular emphasis on the
context in which Tinker was originally decided.

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 34041 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343.
Doninger, 642 F.3d at 34849.
Id. at 350.
Id.
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IV. CLARIFICATION OF THE TINKER STANDARD FOR INTERNET SPEECH
The unique nature of the school environment inherently
requires some deviation from traditional First Amendment
118
constraints in order for the school to operate effectively. Obviously
the same freedom to speak openly on a public sidewalk cannot be
granted to students in the classroom since such freedom would
119
seriously hinder the educational process.
Courts generally review
cases involving the discretionary functions of school officials
deferentially because of the unique decision-making processes and
120
expertise that educational issues entail.
But courts note that this
does not grant unlimited authority for schools officials to trammel
121
the rights of students, and the unique characteristics of the school
setting do not permit school officials to “possess absolute authority
122
This creates a need for schools to balance
over their students.”
students’ rights with school efficiency.
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District are important because
they demonstrate the irreconcilability of the current free speech
paradigm established in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse with the advent of
new media. As the Third Circuit correctly recognized, the Tinker
substantial disruption standard is the only precedent that is neatly
applicable in the Internet context and does not completely deprive
123
students of free speech rights in all settings. Because the outcome
124
of student speech cases is so fact-sensitive, any standard controlling
online expression must be sufficiently broad to accommodate a
variety of situations in order to have long-term applicability. The
Supreme Court should grant certiorari in a student, online speech
case to reform the First Amendment standard for online expression
by (1) establishing cyberspace as a unique “location” for student
speech analysis, and (2) situating Tinker as the governing standard for
all situations that implicate student free speech over the Internet.
There are several important reasons for the Supreme Court to
118

Goldman, supra note 25, at 406. The author noted several less obvious
examples of ways schools interfere with free speech: teachers are restricted in their
freedom to discuss particular topics outside of the curriculum, grades are assigned
based on the quality of a student’s writing and speech, and writing prompts limit
students’ freedom to choose a topic. Id.
119
Id.
120
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 92526 (3d Cir. 2011).
121
Id. at 926.
122
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 506, 511 (1969).
123
See generally Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915; Layshock v. Hermitage Sch.
Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
124
Mattus, supra note 5, at 332.
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articulate a standard governing this issue. Under current free speech
analysis, it can be difficult to advise educators as to when speech can
be punished and when the First Amendment precludes a restraint on
125
student speech.
The lack of a definition for the scope of online
free speech rights can have equally significant implications for a
teacher’s or an administrator’s right to voice his or her opinion
online, as well as on students’ rights, although the consequences of
126
the ambiguity on educators is beyond the scope of this Comment.
“Just as the First Amendment tolerates some false speech to ensure
true speech is not lost, the First Amendment tolerates online student
speech that schools may find reasonably offensive to ensure valuable
127
speech is not lost.” Freedom of expression fosters creative thinking
in young adults, as they develop their voice and learn the value of
128
civil discourse on controversial topics.
Schools certainly have an
interest in discouraging students from engaging in offensive speech
in relation to the school, but this interest is insufficient to justify
giving schools the unbridled authority to control speech that occurs
within a student’s home using the Internet. The current ambiguity in
the law could result in a chilling effect, with students hesitant to voice
opinions on important social or political issues related to school for
129
fear of punishment because of the language they use.
A. Cyberspace as a Unique Location for Online Speech Purposes
The Supreme Court should eliminate the on-campus/offcampus dichotomy for online speech and simply treat cyberspace as
an independent location for the purposes of free speech analysis.
The creation of cyberspace as an independent location would allow
traditional free speech precedent to peacefully co-exist with a new
framework for online speech. This framework would promote
simplicity and predictability in legal analysis by eliminating the need
125

See The Third Circuit Lays Out Rules for Responding to Off-Campus Expression,
DISCHELL, BARTLE, YANOFF, DOOLEY, http://dischellbartle.com/dbyd_difference_feb
_10_part_i_ed_law/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
126
See Jeanette Rundquist & Peggy McGlone, Teachers on Facebook: Hot-button Issue
Examined Across N.J. in Wake of Teacher’s Anti-gay Posts, N.J. STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 18, 2011,
available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/10/nj_school_districts_grapple
_wi.html (discussing a teacher’s Facebook comments on the morality of
homosexuality and the subsequent public reaction). As some parents are calling for
the teacher’s dismissal due to the comments, some guidance by the Court on the
parameters of the First Amendment over the Internet would be beneficial to give
teachers notice of the extent of their rights as well. Id.
127
Tomain, supra note 15, at 105.
128
Macleod-Ball, supra note 28, at 131.
129
Goldman, supra note 25, at 407.
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to weigh factors such as where the speech was originally created,
where it was later accessed, and how and when it ever permeated
school grounds.
Lower courts have noticed the difficulty in applying traditional
130
location-based analysis to online speech.
“If courts and legal
scholars cannot discern the contours of First Amendment protections
for student Internet speech . . . then it is certainly unreasonable to
expect school administrators . . . to predict where the line between
131
on- and off-campus speech will be drawn in this new digital era.”
The prevalence of cell phones in schools has further
complicated the analysis because many students own cell phones with
Internet capabilities that enable them to access social networking
sites from school property without using any school resources to do
132
so. As a borderless medium of communication, there is no obvious
way to establish a location for Internet speech. Scholars have
proposed a variety of ideas, which include designating the location of
speech to be the location where the online expression was originally
133
posted, the location where the speech is ultimately disseminated to
134
others, or the location where the student intended the speech to
135
reach, among others. Although there are certainly merits to each
of these proposals, establishing cyberspace as a distinct location
would eliminate the fact-intensive threshold inquiry of determining a
“location” of the speechan ultimately arbitrary determination given
136
the unique nature of cyberspace.
By definitively articulating a standard in which online speech is
neither on-campus nor off-campus, courts will not have to make
artificial determinations regarding where online speech occurred
and can devote all judicial resources to evaluating the merits of the
case. Establishing cyberspace as a unique place will permit the Court
137
to fashion new rules exclusively for the Internet such as the
130

See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J.,
concurring) (“[H]ow can one tell whether speech takes place on or off campus?
Answering this question will not always be easy.”).
131
Davis, supra note 25.
132
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 951 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
133
Goldman, supra note 25, at 424.
134
Erin Reeves, Note, The “Scope of a Student”: How to Analyze Student Speech in the
Age of the Internet, 42 GA. L. REV. 1127, 114849 (2008).
135
See Patrick, supra note 11, at 888; cf. Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on
Grounds: Protecting Student Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 178 (2003).
136
Tomain, supra note 15, at 130.
137
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and BordersThe Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1379 (1996) (arguing for the establishment of cyberspace as a
distinct location for purposes of trademark analysis, defamation law, fraud and
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application of the Tinker standard as advanced in this Comment—
without disrupting current First Amendment jurisprudence
governing traditional speech. This will also prevent student speech
from being “converted” into on-campus speech inadvertently for
reasons outside of the speaker’s control, as is possible in cases where
another student accesses the content from a school computer
138
unbeknownst to the original speaker.
Speech over the Internet is
inherently different from a statement made in the classroom, and the
Court should recognize it as such by leaving it unregulated by
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.
A potential counterargument is that schools should at least have
the authority to punish students in instances where the student wrote
the offensive content during school hours or used a school
139
computer.
But there is an inherent line-drawing problem in this
argument. For example, it is not apparent how this rule would apply
to situations where an innocent website is made during school hours,
but offensive material is added later at home on the student’s
personal computer. A bright-line rule that treats the Internet as a
unique jurisdictional location for speech purposes works to eliminate
ambiguity in the legal analysis. This is not to suggest that schools are
powerless to regulate students’ Internet use during school hours. On
the contrary, schools can and do use blocking software to restrict
140
access to certain websites on school computers, and faculty should
be encouraged to monitor computer use to ensure that students are
engaging in legitimate educational activities. Teachers are well
within their authority to prevent students from misusing educational
resources and squandering class time and therefore are permitted to
exercise authority to prevent prohibited conduct at the time when
the student is engaging in it.
B. Tinker, not Fraser, Should Govern the Scope of a School’s Authority
The unique characteristics of the school environment may
141
warrant some limitations on students’ First Amendment rights, but
antitrust, and copyright law on the grounds that traditional legal frameworks are
inapplicable to these areas over the Internet. The authors posit that establishing
cyberspace as a distinct jurisdictional location will permit the formation of rules that
are specifically tailored to the unique characteristics of the Internet).
138
See Patrick, supra note 11, at 866 (arguing “this threshold can easily be
manipulated by administrators or a student’s enemies to bring the speech into the
realm of on-campus speech”).
139
See generally id. at 883.
140
Tomain, supra note 15, at 176.
141
Goldman, supra note 25, at 406.
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the Court has repeatedly emphasized that this does not equate to
142
Justice Brennan
limitless authority over student expression.
articulated in his dissent in Kuhlmeier that “[e]ven in its capacity as
educator the State may not assume an Orwellian guardianship of the
143
public mind[.]”
As one legal scholar noted, “[i]f students do not
have free speech rights, Tinker’s ‘schoolhouse gate’ metaphor is
meaningless because a student cannot shed rights that do not
144
exist.” Granting schools the authority to punish students for speech
that occurs off-campus and does not pose a foreseeable risk of a
substantial disruption would “vest school officials with dangerously
145
overbroad censorship discretion.”
The Third Circuit properly
applied First Amendment jurisprudence in Layshock and Blue
Mountain School District by superimposing Tinker as the controlling
legal analysis and declining to extend Fraser to the offensive online
speech.
“Although Tinker may not be looking fabulous at forty” given the
Supreme Court holdings in its wake, it is still viewed as the seminal
146
student-speech case. The Tinker standard not only permits schools
to run efficiently without disturbances, but also protects students’
freedom of expression in all cases where the educational purpose of
the school is not impeded. In the online context under Tinker, a
school can exercise its disciplinary authority in a constitutionally
permissible manner where there are “any facts which might
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial
147
disruption of or material interference with school activities[.]”
Some scholars have suggested that the substantial disruption test
is overbroad in its coverage when the standard is applied to online
148
speech. To address concerns of abuse of the substantial disruption
standard, the Court must clarify what is a “substantial disruption” to
ensure predictability in its application. Doninger v. Neihoff illustrates
the problem of applying the substantial disruption test to scenarios
that clearly do not rise to the Supreme Court’s articulated standards
149
in Tinker.
In Doninger, the court found that phone calls, e-mails,
and angry students were sufficient to amount to a substantial
142

See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 286 (1988) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (citations omitted).
144
Tomain, supra note 15, at 109.
145
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011).
146
Calvert, supra note 24, at 1190.
147
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
148
Goldman, supra note 25, at 408.
149
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
143
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150

disruption of school affairs.
When these arguably commonplace
occurrences are compared with the threat of violence posed by the
expression in Tinker, the tremendous disparity in the levels of severity
clearly demonstrates the need for reiteration of what constitutes a
substantial disruption.
A substantial disruption requires more than “some remote
apprehension of disturbance”; rather, there must be a legitimate
151
threat of it occurring. While, in some cases, angry students, phone
calls, and e-mails to the school administration may appear to present
the potential for a substantial disruption, these actions do not pose
any threat to the school, as they are merely peaceful ways to express
dissatisfaction with a particular school position. A desire to avoid
discomfort by suppressing an unpopular viewpoint does not
152
constitute a “substantial disruption.”
This warrants the conclusion
that, although the school may not want students to post negative
comments about educators online, the mere fact that the comments
portray the school in an unsavory light is not a valid reason to
suppress the expression. While comments about a teacher or a
school administrator on a social networking site may create a strained
153
relationship between the adult and the student, the Court should
clearly establish that such situations, standing alone, do not amount
to a foreseeable substantial disturbance, contrary to the point
154
advanced by the dissent in Blue Mountain.
The Supreme Court
should articulate that lower courts need to keep in mind the
politically turbulent atmosphere that existed at the time Tinker was
155
decided, and judges should weigh the consequences of the speech
in the case before them against the threat posed by the anti-war
speech in Tinker.
The other three Supreme Court cases, while important in the
traditional school speech setting, are ill-suited for application to
online speech cases like Layshock and Blue Mountain School District. Of
156
the three cases, Fraser appears to be the most relevant, but it would
150

Id. at 351.
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 211 (3d Cir. 2001).
152
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
153
Goldman, supra note 25, at 408.
154
See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 945 (3d Cir. 2011) (Fisher,
J., dissenting).
155
Despite the highly polarizing and emotional background of the Vietnam War,
the Tinker Court did not find that the recognizably anti-war bands presented a
foreseeable risk of disruption. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
156
Although it is also possible that an online student speech case could implicate
Morse, this issue has not been raised in the courts yet and therefore does not merit
151
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also be the most constitutionally problematic if applied to online
speech, amounting to a vast expansion of the Fraser Court’s
157
holding. To extend Fraser to all cases where students use offensive
or sexual language in relation to a school issue would give schools
virtually limitless authority to regulate student expression, even
158
within the sanctity of the home. Because of this, the Court should
expressly articulate that Fraser is inapplicable to student speech over
159
the Internet.
An important element in Fraser is that the student speaker had a
captive audience, as he gave the speech during a mandatory school
160
assembly during school hours.
The sexually explicit nature of the
speech in Fraser was another crucial factor, as the Court noted that
“[t]he pervasive sexual innuendo in Fraser’s speech was plainly
161
offensive to both teachers and students[.]”
The grammatical
structure of this statement suggests that the sexual innuendo was the
162
specific reason that the Court categorized the speech as offensive.
Under the Tinker standard, the Third Circuit correctly decided
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District because the school districts
could not show there was a substantial disturbance in either case. If
the Third Circuit applied the Fraser standard, it is likely that the two
students’ suspensions could have been upheld because the profiles in
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District both contained foul and
sexually explicit language. This contrary holding could amount to a
near abolition of student free speech rights because it would give
officials expansive authority to regulate speech any time it contains
offensive language and is directed at the school. Ultimately, this
could lead to censorship in cases where the speaker is making a
political point if the speaker chooses to express himself using
sexualized or obscene language to emphasize his point. The
Supreme Court should clarify that Fraser does not apply to online
student speech to prevent the slippery slope of school regulation of
all offensive speech.

significant discussion. Nevertheless, the limitations emphasized by the Morse Court
would warrant the conclusion that the Court did not intend for Morse to be stretched.
If a Morse-type of case were raised, the Tinker standard should be applied.
157
Tomain, supra note 15, at 99.
158
Mattus, supra note 5, at 334.
159
See Tomain, supra note 15, at 104 (arguing that holding Fraser as inapplicable
to online speech is “more than a mere logical application of Fraser”).
160
See Tomain, supra note 15, at 10304.
161
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
162
Tomain, supra note 15, at 117 n.109.
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C. Limitations to Tinker’s Application in Online Speech
The Supreme Court should further specify that the Tinker
substantial disruption standard is controlling only in cases such as
Layshock and Blue Mountain School District where the expression is not
a threat of violence and the target of the speech is a school employee.
The need to maintain a safe educational environment is a
common argument in support of permitting schools to regulate
students’ speech. The flaw of such an argument is that it overlooks
that “true threats” are already categorically unprotected under First
Amendment jurisprudence in all settingsincluding schools as well
163
as other public places.
Furthermore, courts have generally shown
greater deference to the determination that speech amounts to a true
threat in the school setting, which independently grants schools
164
greater authority to address threatening speech.
School officials
are responsible for the safety of students on school property, and this
compelling interest warrants increased discretion for school officials
to act in cases where there is a plausible threat of violence that rises,
even in situations where the threatening speech is on the borderline
165
There is a significant difference
of the true threat jurisprudence.
between name-calling or offensive remarks and speech that expresses
a threat of violence; therefore, it follows that there should be a
difference in the level of First Amendment protection that each is
166
afforded.
The emotional distinction between students and educators gives
schools a more compelling interest to regulate student speech in
cases involving peer-on-peer cyberbullying than online comments
about a teacher. School-aged youth are “much more vulnerable to
intimidation and mockery than teachers with advanced degrees and
167
20 years of experience.”
Adolescent students lack the emotional
163

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) (defining true threat as statements
that convey to a reasonable person a serious intent to cause violent harm or intent to
make the victim fearful of bodily harm, even if the speaker does not intend to
actually fulfill the threat).
164
Goldman, supra note 25, at 412.
165
See Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the school had the authority to suspend a student for showing other students a
detailed written description of a “dream” about shooting a teacher); Bystrom v.
Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987) (upholding the punishment of
students who created a publication that applauded the vandalism of a teacher’s
home). These cases are examples of situations where the courts afforded school
officials the discretion to address acts of violence, even though the threat may not
have risen to the level of severity of a true threat.
166
Dischell, supra note 125.
167
Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About School Officials
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maturity to deal with derogatory speech in the same capacity as
168
Cyberbullying has emerged as an important problem in
adults.
today’s schools, with one study concluding that thirty percent of
middle-school students had been victimized by cyberbullying for at
169
least two days in the past month.
These policy concerns, among
others, warrant the conclusion that schools should have greater
authority to prevent and respond to the online harassment of fellow
170
students.
When the online speech is aimed at an adult, a school’s
discretion to punish the student should be limited, absent a showing
of a true threat of violence or reasonable foreseeability of a
substantial disturbance in the school. Although studies suggest that
171
teachers can be emotionally affected by student speech,
this
concern is outweighed by the risk of chilling student speech about
potentially important school matters. Teachers and administrators
are in a better position to simply ignore the offensive online speech
and view the speech as a necessary price to pay for the freedoms
172
afforded by the Constitution.
Furthermore, school officials and
employees are not left without recourse against students who choose
173
to post inflammatory and offensive comments on the Internet.
School officials can pursue legal action for relief through the
174
175
courts, under causes of action such as defamation and intentional
176
177
infliction of emotional distress, depending on the circumstances.
and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591, 641 (2011) (citing
Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 95253 (7th Cir. 2002)).
168
Jacob Tabor, Note, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: OffCampus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 600 (2009).
169
Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary:
Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, Cyberbullying Res. Ctr., J. OF SCH. HEALTH (forthcoming
2010), available at http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying_and_self_esteem
_research_fact_sheet.pdf.
170
The legal standard governing school regulation of student-on-student online
speech, although very important, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
171
Waldman, supra note 167, at 644.
172
See Adam Cohen, Why Students Have a Right to Mock Teachers Online, TIME, June
20, 2011, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2078636,00
.html.
173
Davis, supra note 25.
174
Id.
175
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-237
(West) (2011).
176
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). This is
assuming, arguendo, that the student’s conduct rose to the requisite level of severity,
which would likely not be legally sufficient in Layshock or J.S.
177
Whether any particular cause of action would be available to a victimized
educator would require a fact intensive inquiry. The underlying elements of the
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Under the current framework, these alternative legal actions available
to educators can also raise some concerns because the student could
ultimately be punished twice for the same offensive conduct, which
178
some scholars suggest amounts to judicial overkill.
The school
employee can also take non-legal actions, such as simply sitting down
with the student and politely asking for the content to be removed or
179
speaking with the student’s parent.
A different standard for student speech that targets educators, as
opposed to fellow students, is furthered justified by the potential for
conflict-of-interest problems when the educator involved in the
punishment is also the focus of the disparaging speech. In cases such
as Layshock and Blue Mountain School District where the speech is
directed at a key decision-maker in the school—the principal—that
decision-maker’s objectivity may be compromised because of the
180
personal impact on him or her.
The decision-maker’s personal
181
therefore,
feelings could influence any punishment imposed;
requiring teachers and administrators to show that the speech caused
a substantial disruption would help curb the potential for abuse of
discretion that could occur under a less protective standard of
182
student speech.

causes of actions and the remedies each affords are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
178
Calvert, supra note 24, at 1178.
179
Although these solutions may, on their face, seem overly idealistic, they would
likely be successful. For example, in Layshock, after the principal confronted Justin
about the profile, Justin apologized verbally and through a letter and took down the
profile immediately. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir.
2011). In one study, a researcher sent e-mails to adolescents with MySpace profiles
that contained evidence of illegal or sexual behavior, suggesting that the individuals
“modify their profiles or make them private.” Although the researcher had no
connection to the individuals contacted, some of the profiles were changed. Perri
Klass, Seeing Social Media More as Portal Than as Pitfall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/health/views/seeing-social-media
-as-adolescent-portal-more-than-pitfall.html. This suggests that, in cases where there
is a relationship between the individuals, social pressure might lead to even higher
voluntary compliance rates.
180
Goldman, supra note 25, at 422.
181
Id.
182
For example, the Fraser “offensive” standard would have great potential for
abuse. What is offensive to today’s school-aged generation can be very different from
what is offensive to an adult. If school districts were given the same deference by the
courts to punish speech aimed at adults as students, it would not seem far-fetched to
suggest that hurt feelings could bias an administrator’s determination of whether the
speech is in fact offensive.
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V. CONCLUSION
“Tinker and its progeny are not well adapted to today’s
technological world where the once-certain schoolhouse gate is
183
virtually nonexistent.” Under current law, all student-speech cases
184
are controlled by four Supreme Court decisions; however, all four
cases were decided in the context of on-campus speech. The
Supreme Court has never addressed the applicability of this First
Amendment framework to student speech that occurs on the
Internet, and therefore circuit courts and district courts alike have
experienced difficulty in establishing the parameters of student
online free speech rights.
185
Because of the unique characteristics of the Internet, the
Court should formulate a new standard establishing cyberspace as a
unique location instead of forcing lower courts to struggle in
applying the traditional student-speech framework, which focuses on
the on-campus/off-campus distinction, to the Internet. The Court
should set Tinker as the controlling standard for determining whether
school officials have the authority to punish student speech.
Furthermore, the Court should recognize the need to give school
officials greater deference in situations where the speech poses a
threat to school safety or when the speech targets a fellow classmate,
as opposed to a school employee.

183
184
185

Mattus, supra note 5, at 335; see also supra Part IV.
See discussion of the four Supreme Court cases supra Part II.
See Johnson, supra note 137.

